


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
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


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1. KOMMUNIST SCORES MOLOTOV FOR LACK OF FLEXIBILITY 25X1A

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[redacted] The lead editorial in the same issue of Kommunist that also published Molotov's admission of ideological error emphasizes the necessity of flexibility in tactics with special reference to Molotov's primary field of responsibility, foreign relations. It asserted that the Communist Party "daringly combines adherence to principles and flexibility in foreign policy; precisely this caused enormous successes of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace."

Comment

The Kommunist editorial appears directed against Molotov for his general inflexibility and obstructionism as one of the formulators of top policy, internal as well as foreign. Molotov is apparently out of tune with the dominant opinion in the Communist Party Presidium and may be in danger of losing his position on that body as well as the foreign minister's post.

2. STASSEN COMMENTS ON DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS

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The USSR has apparently modified its earlier position on complete elimination of atomic weapons, according to a remark made by a member of the Soviet delegation to American delegate Stassen in private discussions following the final meeting of the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament on 8 October. The Soviet representative said the USSR now means by the term "prohibition of atomic weapons" merely prohibition of their use and their production for military purposes rather than destruction of existing stocks. Stassen believes, therefore, that the USSR is prepared to move toward agreement with the US position that elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately guaranteed through inspection.

Summarizing the recent Disarmament Subcommittee meetings in New York, the US delegate considers that the USSR will probably accept the Eisenhower Geneva proposals on blueprints and aerial photography only if (1) they are extended to include Germany, the most likely instigator of another war from the Soviet viewpoint; (2) there is some definite assurance that armaments will be reduced subsequent to the initiation of the President's proposals; and (3) the system of ground inspectors at major terminals as envisaged in the USSR's 10 May proposals is extended, at least to include Germany.

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4. IRANIAN ADHERENCE TO BAGHDAD PACT REPORTED IMMINENT

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[REDACTED] The Shah of Iran has decided to adhere to the Baghdad pact "within the next few days," Prime Minister Ala told Ambassador Chapin on 8 October. In his speech to the Iranian Senate on the same day, the Shah stated that "appropriate steps will be taken for strengthening the defense potential of our country" and these "must take precedence over all other matters." The Shah, according to Ala, believes Iran's adherence is "a case of now or never," because popular and Majlis opposition is growing progressively stronger.

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Shah, apparently ready to ignore recent Soviet approaches on this subject, can probably gain parliamentary ratification of Iran's adherence if he acts now.

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[REDACTED]

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